Download Jurnal Akuntansi SNA 13 >> Pengujian Peran Perlindungan Investor dan Kultur terhadap Perilaku Managemen Laba pada Perusahaan Keluarga: Studi Internasional
Francisca Reni Retno Anggraini
Yavida Nurim
Program Doktor Universitas Gadjah Mada, Jogjakarta
Nung Harjanto
Akademi Akuntansi YKPN, Jogjakarta
Abstract
Prior researches have proved that the level of investor protection has positive relationship withearnings quality, because the inside shareholders take benefit from outside shareholders.However, alignment approach views that family firms which the majority of shares owned byindividual or family concern with the firm value, so family ownership has positive relationshipwith earnings quality. Based on the inconsistency results, this study examines the role of investorprotection level for increasing the family firms’ earnings quality.
This study also examines the role of culture in a country for increasing the family firms’ earningsquality, because culture influences accounting practice in the firm. The investor protection levelis measured by LaPorta et al.’s proxy, culture uses power distance andindividualism/collectivism, and family ownership is proxied by the percentage of share ownedby individual or family. The study only uses the firms that their shares at least 20% owned byindividual or family as sample. The sample is taken from 2002-2008 OSIRIS data base.
Based on the examination of family firms in around 17 countries, this study reveals that theindividual or family as inside shareholders has positive effect to the earnings quality. Thisevidence reveals that family firms tend to choose the alignment behaviour. Surprisingly, investorprotection has less benefit in increasing the family firms’ earnings quality, but culture in acountry influences the family’s behaviour through ameliorating or deteriorating the earningsquality.
Keywords: perlindungan investor, kultur, perusahaan keluarga, dan managemen laba
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In general, research on the protection of investors to assume the insiders, both management and inside shareholders, take advantage of outside shareholders (investors or creditors). Outside investors are in a position opposite the manager and major shareholder in the decision making process or voting process. On the other hand, outsiders can not access the information into the company, while insiders have privileged information on the company. These conditions encourage stock ownership is concentrated so that majority shareholders have a guarantee to obtain the return of investment (Laporta et al. 1998). Claessens et al. (2000) also show a majority of shares in state enterprises are categorized Laporta et al. (1998) has a low level of investor protection, such as Indonesia, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, and Taiwan, are owned by the family.
Level of investor protection in a country plays an important role towards the country’s economy both at macro and micro level. Laporta et al. (1998) proved that countries with low levels of investor protection has a market capitalization value of GNP and lower capital compared to countries with a high level of investor protection. Leuz et al. (2003) and Francis and Wang (2008) also reveals that countries with low levels of investor protection which have a low level of earnings quality. In line with De Fond and Hung (2007) and Hung (2000), investor protection is positively correlated with the value relevance of accounting information…….
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