Ekspropriasi Pemegang Saham Minoritas Dalam Struktur Kepemilikan Ultimat
DR. Baldric Siregar, M.B.A., Ak.
Large shareholders establish control over a firm through pyramid structure and cross-holding among firms. Those types of ownership structure create divergence between cash flow rights and control rights. Large shareholders may have control over a firm despite little cash flow rights. This study investigates the effects of cash flow right and control right separation on firm value of Indonesian companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period of 2000 to 2004. I use cut-off point of 10 percent control rights to test those effects. The results show that cash flow rights have positive effect on firm value. When using higher cut-off points, cash flow right leverage has negative effect on firm value. For cut-off point up to 50 percent, however, control rights have no significant effect on firm value. I further test that the cash flow right leverage might depend on the controlling shareholders’ participation in firm management and the presence of the second controlling shareholder. The evidence shows that the coefficients on both interactions are insignificant.
Keywords: cash flow rights, control rights, cash flow right leverage, pyramiding, cross-holding, immediate ownership, ultimate ownership, expropriation, firm value.
The concentration of ownership can be identified either by ownership imediat well with ultimate ownership. Imediat ownership, which has been most commonly used, has a weakness in assessing the patterns of corporate ownership because the chain of ownership is not tracked until the final possession. La Porta et al. (1999) introduced a new concept in tracing the ownership of public companies named ultimate ownership. With the ultimate ownership, chain ownership, controlling shareholders, separation of cash flow rights and control rights, and the mechanism for increased control in the company can be identified.
The phenomenon of separation of cash flow rights and control rights emerged as the controlling shareholder of a company can control either directly or indirectly through other companies. In concentrated ownership is determined based on the concept of ultimate, the concentration of ownership can be a concentration of cash flow rights and control rights concentration. Both these concentrations can vary due to the mechanism of increased control by the controlling shareholder. This research aims to verify the phenomenon of separation of cash flow rights and control rights over the possibility of expropriation by the controlling shareholder to another shareholder test the effect of separation on the value of the company.