Pengaruh Konsentrasi Kepemilikan Institusional dan Leverage terhadap Manajemen Laba, Nilai Pemegang Saham serta Cost of Equity Capital
Universitas Trunojoyo Bangkalan Madura
This study was aimed to analyze the effect of institutional ownerships concentration and leverage towards earnings management, shareholders value and cost of equity capital. This study was based on agency theory and economic consequences.
This study was performed using field research. Data were collected from The Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD). The population in this study is 102 firms which are listed at the Jakarta Stock Exchange from 2004-2005 and derived using some criteria. This study use Partial Least Square technique.
The result showed that earnings management was negatively affected by institutional ownerships concentration and positively affected by leverage. Shareholders value was negatively affected by leverage. Cost of equity capital was positively affected by institutional ownerships concentration, earnings management, and shareholders value.
The findings might be of interest to investors and creditors to make investment and credit decision. The study contributed to the literature in that has shown that earnings management is driven by shareholders value increasing rather than motive opportunistic management. Institutional ownerships concentration was positively reaction by capital market, so that evidence of them weren’t expropriation on minority shareholder’s and capital market.
Key words: agency theory, concentration institutional ownerships, earnings management, leverage, shareholders value, cost of equity capital.
Since Berle and Means (1932:11-12) investigated the structure of corporate ownership of public agency problem is a central issue in financial literature. With the increasing amount of corporate and business area, then the owner can not manage his own company directly so that is what triggered the emergence of agency problems. In relation to ownership of the agency there were two problems, namely agency problems between management and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the agency problem between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The first agency problem occurs when the dispersed stock ownership, so that individual shareholders can not control the management.
As a result the company can be run as desired management itself. The second agency problem occurs when there is a majority shareholder (ownership concentration), so there is a majority shareholder who can control the management or even become part of management itself. As a result, the majority shareholder has absolute control over minority shareholders, so that majority shareholders can perform actions that benefit themselves, but are likely detrimental to minority shareholders.
Jurnal Simposium Nasional Akuntasi XI (SNA 11)