Pengaruh Pemisahan Hak Aliran Kas Dan Hak Kontrol Terhadap Dividen
Baldric siregar
STIE YKPN Yogyakarta
ABSTRACT
The expropriation of minority shareholders by Those of controlling shareholder is the main agency conflict in firms with concentrated ownership. The expropriation is Obvious Pls cash flow rights and control rights are separated through pyramiding and cross-holdings. The ultimate ownership concept is Used to Investigate identify the separation and its implications on dividends. By using the sample consists of the firms listed in the Jakarta Stock Exchange for the period from 2000 to 2004, empirical Evidences That shows the cash flow rights and control rights do not go together but have Different implications.
The concentration of cash flow rights is an incentive to avoid expropriation. Can this be seen from Evidences of positive effects of cash flow rights on dividends. On the other hand, the control rights concentration is an incentive to generate private benefits through expropriation. This conclusion is supported by evidence of the negative effects of control rights on dividends. When control rights Exceed cash flow rights, the controlling shareholders have higher incentive to expropriate by participating in firm’s management. The controlling shareholders’ participation in management makes Them more freely to generate private benefits. But the incentive is lower Pls help a firm has the second controlling shareholder. The second controlling shareholder cans mitigate the controlling shareholder’s incentive to expropriate.
Keywords: expropriation, cash flow rights, control rights, cash flow rights leverage, pyramiding, cross-holding, immediate ownership, ultimate ownership, dividend.
1. INTRODUCTION
Agency problem is a central issue in financial literature since Berle and Means (1932) investigate the ownership structure of listed companies. In companies with dispersed ownership, individual shareholders have no control over the management to act in harmony with the interests of shareholders. Principal agency problem in a company like this is the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. But in companies with concentrated ownership, no shareholder can control the management or even part of the management itself. Agency problem that stands out in a company like this is the agency conflict between shareholders pengendali1 with minority shareholders.
Concepts that have been commonly used to identify the existence of concentration of ownership is the concept of ownership imediat.2 imediat ownership concept has a weakness in the study of patterns of corporate ownership because the concept of ownership can not be used to identify the chain of ownership, controlling shareholders, separation of cash flow rights and control rights , and the mechanism of the increase in corporate control (La Porta et al., 1999).
* Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 10 – Makassar
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